First, transaction costs tend to be comparatively high in land-sale markets (e.g., because it is costly to subdivide large farms so as to make them suitable for smallholder cultivation), and fixed costs (e.g., costs associated with formal registration) may exist that discourage small land transactions (or drive them into informality). Second, to the extent that the value of the ability to use land as collateral or the expected appreciation of land values is capitalized in land prices, small producers will find it more difficult to acquire land. Third, in the presence of serious credit-and insurance-market imperfections, repeated adverse shocks may force smallholders to sell off land in periods of distress, while well-endowed farmers are better able to insure themselves through access to credit, temporary depletion of accumulated nonland assets, or diversification of income sources. Fourth, in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, land ownership can be used to accumulate savings, particularly as a hedge against inflation, at the cost of productive inefficiency.
When the above factors are at play, land transfers from large to small family farmers are hampered, thus causing the persistence of a pattern of land distribution that is not only inequitable but also inefficient. Indeed, in the presence of labor-supervision costs and semi-or nontradable factors (family labor, bullock services, and managerial ability), management diseconomies arise that make large farms less profitable than small, owner-operated family farms. An inverse relationship between land productivity and farm size should therefore be observed, at least when agricultural technology is not too capital intensive. The idea that optimal farm size generally does not exceed the scale at which family labor is fully occupied (allowing for the use of seasonal hired laborers for specific tasks) has actually been confirmed by a large number of empirical studies, including recent studies using panel data with household-or plotspecific effects. 1 The adverse distributive consequences of pervasive, rural-market imperfections have received particular attention among economists. For example, Michael Carter (1997) has argued that, as small differences in initial endowments map into different risk-coping capacities, the land market, when it arises, tends to polarize the land-ownership distribution. In this framework, land distribution evolves not so much as a result of sales by inefficient smallholders but because of pervasive market imperfections to which small farmers are especially vulnerable (Berry and Cline 1979; Collier 1983; Green 1987; Eswaran and Kotwal 1990; Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995; Kevane 1996; Carter 1997, 1999; Carter and Zimmerman 1998; Dercon 1998; Platteau 2000, chap. 4) . 2 To illustrate, André and Platteau (1997) have shown that, in Rwanda, land inequality has deepened significantly over a short span of time, mostly through land sales and purchases. While land purchases were mostly made by wealthy households with some access to nonagricultural employment, two-thirds of the land sales consisted of distress sales, half of which have been driven by emergency expenditures related to subsistence food or health. Malfunctioning credit markets, missing insurance markets, and nonagricultural labor markets that are both thin and discriminatory (political connections help secure a privileged access to the scarce employments available, mainly in development projects and the public sector) have thus been responsible for the strongly disequalizing effect of a quite active land-sale market.
The same phenomenon has been documented by Cain (1981) for India and Bangladesh. He shows that, whenever risk-coping mechanisms for smallholders are absent or highly imperfect, most of the land-sale market activity is driven by distress sales to obtain food and medicine. Yet, interestingly, his study provides powerful counterfactual evidence that, where consumption-smoothing devices exist, the opposite pattern obtains. Indeed, in villages that had access to a safetynet program, the land-sale market helped equalize the land-ownership distribution: rich farmers sold land to undertake productivity-enhancing investments, while small farmers were able to acquire a large part of the lands on offer in order to enlarge their own landholdings.
That market imperfections may not be severe enough to prevent transfers of land from large to small farmers is also evident from a study by Place and Migot-Adholla (1998) , who concluded that land markets in Kenya were not disequalizing because most purchases formed the only piece of land of the buyer. Likewise, Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) did not find evidence of distress sales in their Kenyan study site (although dispossessed farmers may have migrated out, creating a selection bias in the respondents). Such evidence tends to disprove the prediction made by Lord Swynnerton in 1954 when defending 2 Note that the market imperfections that bear upon land distribution are not limited to the rural environment. The wealthy elite may choose to accumulate land in an unproductive manner insofar as it provides them with a valuable collateral for nonagricultural loans and with an effective hedge against inflation in a context of imperfect nationwide capital markets (for evidence on Uganda, see Barrows and Roth [1989] ). This is especially true of periurban areas where there is a large incidence of absentee ownership (Collier 1983; Green 1987) . Unproductive acquisition of land assets may also arise from concerns with old-age insurance and retirement, as well as from social prestige and political considerations (such as the need to acquire membership in a rural community to get elected into local councils and start a political career) that confer a nonproductive value on land ownership (Doornbos 1975; Baland and Robinson 2006) . the introduction of land titling in Kenya: "In [the] future, . . . able and energetic rich Africans will be able to acquire more land, and bad and poor, . . . less, creating a landed and landless class. This is a normal step in the development of a country" (Kiamba 1989, 132) . Swynnerton did not perceive the importance of imperfections in complementary factor markets as the cause of the anticipated move of land concentration. Contrary to what the inverse size-productivity relationship implies, he instead advocated the existence of a large, optimal farm size.
Since the impact of land-sale transactions on land distribution is a priori ambiguous, depending on the severity of the problems mentioned above, it is important to multiply empirical studies, especially in areas where these transactions are frequent. Uganda offers a particularly valuable terrain in this respect. Indeed, the activity of rural land-sale markets, especially in the centraleastern and southeastern parts of the country, appears to be among the highest in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, a region for which there are actually very few studies documenting the activity of rural land-sale markets. By comparison, the role of land-rental markets, which have received much more attention in the empirical literature, seems to be rather modest in our survey area. One possibility is that, against the general trends summarized earlier, there are significant transaction costs associated with the latter (see esp. Skoufias 1995) .
Moreover, there are two characteristics of the Ugandan terrain that make it especially attractive for our purpose. First, it displays high rates of rural immigration. The well-documented degradation of soil fertility Krishna et al. 2006 ) combined with high rates of realized conversion of woodland and grazing land to agricultural fields (Place, Ssenteza, and Otsuka 2001) in many parts of southern Uganda explain why a significant proportion of farmers move in the hope of improving their living conditions. 3 The question that springs to mind, then, is whether land-market development allows farmers from less-endowed areas to settle and purchase land in better-endowed areas, thereby mitigating interregional disparities and increasing efficiency in land ownership.
Second, division of family land through inheritance, whether pre-or postmortem, is quite unequal, with the result that a significant number of young farmers have a small or zero land endowment. Yet, to the extent that they are compensated by their parents in terms of other assets, credit-market failures should not discourage land transfers from landed to landless or marginal local farmers. Whether we can actually confirm that the latter are able to overcome their initial handicap through land purchases is therefore an interesting question to elucidate on the basis of our empirical material.
Widely reported in the literature dealing with land-tenure systems in Africa are customary restrictions or norms prescribing that indigenous farmers should have priority access to land parcels supplied in the local-sale market. Typically, sales are subject to a right of preemption by the seller (or his family), meaning that any land parcel sold in the past is redeemable by the seller when he gets the wherewithal to repurchase it. More generally, a piece of land may be sold but only with the explicit approval of the village elders (or the lineage heads) who see to it that no member of the local community (the lineage) wants to acquire the land before authorizing the sale (Platteau 2005, 266-67) . 4 If migrants are not discriminated against compared with local villagers in need of land, this is prima facie evidence that customary restrictions are no longer in force and that the land market operates in an unhampered manner. The fact that land-sale transactions have been observed for a long time and that individualization and legalization of land-tenure rights have gone a long way in the surveyed areas suggests that customary restrictions might indeed have vanished.
Whether the activity of land-rental markets contributes to equalizing transfers is another question that is addressed in the current study. In this respect, economic theory is much less ambiguous than in the case of land-sale transactions. As a matter of fact, it predicts that credit-and insurance-market imperfections should have much less impact on land-rental markets than on land-sale markets. This is partly because there is a flexible menu of land-rental contracts with different characteristics among which the parties can choose depending on the type of market failures that need to be mitigated. Empirical studies confirm that land-rental transactions are generally equalizing at least when property rights are secure and agriculture remains traditional. It is only when agriculture becomes more capital intensive and the landlord class more urbanized, or when government regulations create uncertainty in property rights, that use of such transactions for gaining access to land, adjusting farm size, and providing upward mobility toward eventual land ownership becomes more difficult for the poor (Bell and Sussangkarn 1988; Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami 1992; Skoufias 1995; Sadoulet, Murgai, and Janvry 2001; Deininger and Feder 2002; Ciaian and Swinnen 2006) .
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In Section II, we provide basic information about our sample areas and our methods of data collection. Thereafter, we focus on the characteristics of these areas in terms of migrant flows and inheritance practices. In Section III, we investigate the impact of land-sale and rental transactions on land distribution in the light of descriptive statistics. In Section IV, we investigate econometrically the effects of initial land endowment and the place of birth on the probability of participating in local land markets as buyer or tenant and their effects on the amount of land purchased. Control variables are introduced in the regressions so as to measure the true effects of these two key variables. Section V concludes.
II. Land Markets in Uganda: A Historical Perspective
Two major tenure systems coexist in Uganda: the customary system practiced by the Busoga to the east and north of Kampala and the mailo system prevailing among the Buganda to the west and south of the same city. 5 In customary areas, land was historically divided among clans. The clan would in turn allocate land to households based upon need (i.e., consumption requirements and labor resources). Once allocated, land could be used indefinitely by families and was transferred from fathers to sons through inheritance. Other clan members generally retained some rights to household land, such as grazing, firewood collection, and approval of certain land transactions (see Place et al. 2001) .
Prior to 1900, all rural land in Uganda was governed by traditional, customary tenure systems. Around 1900, the British, in an attempt to co-opt the assistance of traditional rulers, demarcated large areas of land and gave legal title over these lands to chiefs, among whom was the kabaka, or chief of the Buganda, and other notables. In the Buganda kingdom where most of this occurred, the mile was used as a unit of measure, and the resulting privatetenure system became known as mailo tenure. The recipients of large land parcels quickly partitioned their estates to rent out tiny parcels to tenants against the payment of a fee. In order to protect the latter's rights, the colonial government later passed legislation prohibiting eviction without due compensation. This led to long-term tenancies, known as kibanjas, which have since been transferred through inheritance or sale to other tenants (West 1972; Noronha 1985) .
Moreover, in the Buganda area, some public lands (formerly called the Crown lands) had been reserved by colonial authorities and were de facto administered by local chiefs until 1966 and occupied by settlers and squatters. In 1975, under the Land Reform Decree, customary lands and Crown lands were treated similarly in the Buganda region, and we shall refer to these as public land tenure. However, through the Land Commission, the state exercised increasing authority over these lands, especially those located close to Kampala, and it began to grant leaseholds of varying lengths, mostly to well-connected individuals from the urban elite (see, e.g., Kafureka 1992) . These newly leased lands were often cultivated by squatter families, with no legal protection against arbitrary eviction, while an increasing number of leaseholders asserted their individual rights on the land, typically by fencing off their properties (Barrows and Kisamba-Mugerwa 1989; Place et al. 2001, 198) .
The 1975 Land Reform Decree declared all land, whether mailo or customary, to be state land, leased to occupants for a maximum of 99 years. Since the decree was never fully implemented, however, its practical impact was rather limited. Customary tenure "remained in its usual state of limbo" (McAuslan 2000, 22) , and, in mailo lands, insecurity of rights was increased rather than reduced: as rents were declared illegal, further settlement of tenants was discouraged, while tenants' rights became varied and uncertain, particularly in the case of absentee landlordism. At the same time, ambiguity of the government's plans to settle overlapping tenure has created uncertainty among mailo owners as well (Kisamba-Mugerwa 1989; Muhereza 1992; Bikaako 1994) .
With the advent to power of President Museveni and the National Resistance Movement in 1987, new efforts at clarifying the legal structure of land rights in the country have been pursued. The new strand of land policy is clearly oriented toward the establishment of a uniform system of land tenure based on freehold tenure. Through the 1998 Land Bill, customary tenure is being phased out as freehold titles (whether under the form of certificates of ownership or of duly registered titles) replace occupation under customary law. The latter implies the disappearance of public land, and customary tenants there are now protected against the whims of officials willing to grant the land that they occupy to whomsoever they see fit or whomsoever will pay (for examples of this, see Bazaara [1992] ). Unfortunately, no effort was made to address the potential conflict on public land between the leaseholder and the customary occupant (McAuslan 2000) .
As a concession to Buganda, mailo land was also restored. Yet, the provisions of the Land Bill are designed in such a way that owners of land in Buganda "retain their freehold title but lose virtually all effective rights of ownership in the land." This is because the occupants acquire rights of permanent oc-cupation, subject to paying a nominal rent, and they are able to deal with the land as they see fit, which includes the possibility to sell their occupancy rights, subject to very limited rights of refusal by the landlord. Such a reduction of landlords' rights to strictly bare ownership is the fulfillment of a political promise made to the occupants and tenants during the guerrilla struggle that led Museveni to power (McAuslan 2000, 18) .
III. The Impact of Land Markets on the Distribution of Land
To get better insights into the actual working of land markets in Uganda, we collected data on 310 households in 36 villages located in five different districts of east and central Uganda (Iganga, Kamuli, Luwero, Mukono, and Mpigi). Our sample is a multistage, stratified random sample based on two stratification criteria: population density and tenure regime. This area allows for wide variations in population density within the two tenure systems. The southernmost sites are located in a highly favorable agroclimatic zone, where there are two rainy seasons and coffee is a major crop. The climate changes fairly rapidly when moving north and eventually becomes quite dry in the northern sites. There is only one rainy season in these sites, and crops such as sorghum and cassava are therefore the main staples. Population densities vary in accordance with these agroclimatic variations, ranging from 9 to 502 per square kilometer.
6 Large migratory movements are observed, enabling us to also investigate the impact of land-market development on intercommunity transfers of land assets. Village questionnaires were administered to a group of elders and local leaders of the village, with a particular emphasis on land rights, land transactions, and land conflicts. Households surveys, with information on activities, land assets, wealth and land rights, were separately administered, using a pseudorandom procedure (e.g., we retain every fourth, eighth, twelfth, etc., household in a certain direction). Once unreliable, incomplete, and atypical interview data are dropped, the final sample reduces from 331 to 310 households.
Rural land markets are very active in the area under study. 8 Thus, 49% of the total land area owned (and 47% of the total farm size) has been purchased, a figure close to the proportion of 45% found by Place (1995) in a similar area. The intensity of land-market activity is also reflected in the fact that 50% of the households have farms comprising at least one purchased parcel and that 43% of the 500 land parcels covered by our study have been purchased. Land-sale markets in the area have been active for a long time, since the average date of acquisition of purchased parcels is 1975 (more than 20 years before the time of the survey). Moreover, farmers tend to purchase land at an early age, as the mean age at the time of acquisition is only 27 years.
Not only is the land market active, but it also appears relatively unconstrained by traditional controls over land exchanges. Thus, only 14% of the parcels purchased have been bought directly from (even distant) relatives, and only 13%, from neighbors. As a matter of fact, a large majority (65%) of the parcels have been bought from persons with which the household has little direct connections, such as landlords or previously unknown persons. Traditional leaders are rarely involved in land transactions. In the 36 villages surveyed, when land is sold to an outsider, only two villages require a prior authorization, and only 15, a prior notification of the sale.
9 Traditional authorities intervened in only three of the 16 conflicts over land sales (over the past 10 years reported in the village surveys), while the local administrative authority intervened in all the other cases.
Perhaps surprisingly, temporary transfers of land are less frequent than landsale transactions, and they involve smaller parcels: only 12% of the land parcels are rented in (representing only 4% of the farm size), and only 17% of the households have rented in or borrowed land (which is close to the figure of 24% reported for the central region by Deininger and Okidi [2001, 134] ). Rental contracts are typically for 1 year, renewable, and rented parcels have on average been with the same farmer for the last 5 years.
10 None of the households interviewed rented in any land in 11 of the 36 villages visited. While the average size of a plot purchased is 6.40 acres and that of a plot inherited is 5.45 acres, the size of a plot rented in is only 1.69 acres. A typical household in our sample inherits 3.81 acres, purchases 3.20 acres, and rents in 0.29 acres of land.
The villages surveyed are areas of net immigration. There is very little outmigration, and 16% of the 310 households surveyed are first-generation migrants (defined as the household head was not born and did not inherit any In what follows, we refer to them as migrants. As a result, the villages surveyed are also ethnically heterogeneous, with an average of six distinct ethnic groups per village. Not surprisingly, however, there exists a dominant ethnic group in each village: on average, 72% of the households in a village belong to the same ethnic group.
The average farm size in the area is 6.86 acres. It varies consistently across villages, particularly as soil quality and population density vary. Still, many farms are composed of a single parcel, because there are on average only 1.6 parcels per farm. This may suggest the existence of a minimum operational size beyond which the farm is not sustainable. The predominance of parcels of large size is directly related to the fact that inheritance patterns are very unequal. In the household questionnaire, we asked for information on how the farm of the father of the household head has been divided upon inheritance. Out of a sample of 243 cases for which the father is dead, the father did not give land to one of his sons in 161 cases. The coefficient of variation in the amount of inherited land across all sons within a family is quite large: the average value of this coefficient is equal to 1.24 (and the median value is 1.15). Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the coefficients of variation in land inherited within a family. We can see that there are two modal values, one at zero and one slightly above 1. This finding is surprising, because it goes against the standard inheritance practice of equal division of land property observed in most patrilinear systems of sub-Saharan Africa (see Platteau and Baland 2001) , which would imply a large mode around zero.
Let us define potential inheritance by dividing the father's farm size by the number of male inheritors in the family (which include the head of the household who was interviewed). As for actual land inheritance, it is obtained as follows: for native farmers whose parents are dead, we add up all the inherited parcels, while for those whose parents are still alive, the parcels considered are those that have been permanently given to them by their parents (inter vivos transfers), generally upon marriage. Such gifts are actually an anticipated inheritance and typically correspond to the inheritance share of each married son. Given that some inherited parcels may have been sold or given away, we also add all parcels sold or given away in the past, which may lead to an overestimation of real initial endowments. 11 We define a landless farmer as a native farmer whose land inheritance is equal to zero. Regarding migrants, we use potential inheritance as the measure of initial endowments, since we do not observe their actual inheritance. Among natives, the coefficient of correlation between potential inheritance and land inherited is low and equal to 0.31, which again reflects unequal patterns of land inheritance.
We first turn to the impact of land markets on the initial distribution of land. Figure 2 presents the Lorenz curves that obtain for potential inheritance, actual land inheritance, and current farm size for the native farmers in our sample. The change in the Lorenz curves shows that land-market transactions have unambiguously reduced the inequality in the distribution of land inheritance: land distribution after land transactions is more equal than the initial land distribution, whether we take as the initial reference the distribution of actual or potential land inheritance, and the change is far from negligible. The difference between the Lorenz curve of the farm sizes and that of the initial endowments is significant at the probability threshold of 0.011.
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Thus, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of potential endowment among native farmers is equal to 0.60, while it is equal to 0.63 for the distribution of actual land inheritance. Through land purchases, it then falls to 0.59, and to 0.53 when adding rentals and borrowals. If we focus on native farmers whose father is dead, the Gini of potential endowment is equal to 11 Information based on recall methods tends to be unreliable, particularly when related to the distant past. The questionnaires also tend to produce unreliable information when they are too long and too "repetitive" on related topics. We have, therefore, privileged more precise information on currently observable characteristics, such as the size and origin of the field parcels that are currently under operation. It is possible that some of the land sold was acquired by purchases in the past. All of our results, however, are robust to alternative definitions of initial endowments, such as not adding land sold. Thus, the correlation between the measure of land inheritance used in the main text and the one obtained by not adding sales is equal to 96%. Our results have also been systematically recomputed on the basis of the subsample of native farmers whose father has passed away, yet they prove to be remarkably stable. 12 To this end, we used the DAD statistical software provided by Jean-Yves Duclos (Laval). Note. The small difference between farm size and the sum of land inherited, purchased, and rented in corresponds to land given or lent. Note. Data are for native farmers whose father is dead.
0.60, the Gini of land inheritance, to 0.57, the Gini of owned land, to 0.51, and the Gini of farm size, to 0.49.
In table 1, we compare land transactions across three categories of farmers: native nonlandless, native landless, and migrant. The most striking feature of the table is that the average farm size is identical for the two types of native farmers: 7.3 versus 7.2 acres. This is a direct consequence of the fact that landless farmers are able to purchase 2.5 times and to rent in 4 times more land in the local markets than the other native farmers. Migrant farmers are less successful than native landless farmers in their access to land, as their actual farm size is only 4.6 acres, but they also buy and rent in more land than nonlandless farmers native of the locality. Thanks to the operation of the land-sale and rental markets, landless farmers are thus able to acquire a farm of the same size as that of the other native farmers, and migrants are actually able to convert the land property potentially inherited in their father's village (4.9 acres) into a landholding of about the same size in their new location (4.6 acres).
In table 2, we focus on all native farmers whose father is dead and divide them into 6 different quantiles based on the amount of land they have inherited.
For each quantile, we present the average amount of land purchased and the average farm size.
Once again, the distribution of farm size is much more equal than the distribution of land inherited. First, total farm size does not vary much across most of the endowment quantiles, except at the very top end of the distribution. The biggest farmers approximately maintain their farm size at the level of their initial endowment, while all those below them use land markets to enlarge it beyond the initial endowment. Second, farmers who did not inherit any land buy much more land than farmers in any other quantile, and their actual farm size corresponds to the village average. They therefore end up with a significantly larger farm size than farmers starting with a small initial endowment (and particularly those in the second quantile). Quasi-landless people from the second-lowest quintile are significantly less able than pure landless farmers to purchase land and thereby compensate their initial small land endowment. This phenomenon can again be explained by looking at the amount of potential inheritance across farmers, since landless farmers originate from families that on average owned more land than those of quasi-landless farmers. Moreover, the smaller farms tend to be found in areas of higher population density and higher land quality (the proportion of area under poor crops, such as cassava, for these small farms is half of the sample average). This last fact justifies the use of village controls and village fixed effects in the regressions.
In light of the above, there is evidence that rural land markets allowed farmers with little or no land inherited to acquire proportionally more land than the other farmers. Land markets do not favor farmers with large initial land endowment. In this sense, land markets have mitigated initial inequality in the amount of land inherited, particularly in favor of those who did not inherit any land. This being said, it is also striking that, on the whole, landless farmers come from families well endowed in land, so that the per capita dynastic distribution of wealth appears relatively stable.
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It must moreover be noted that there is a selection bias in our sample, since we have no information about people who sold their land and left the villages surveyed. If these people were forced to leave the area because their initial endowment was too small and they could not get access to the land market, we overestimate the equalizing impact of land-sale transactions. As we shall argue below, however, this potential bias is not really present, insofar as the areas under study have known very little out-migration. If, however, those who left were motivated by the desire to seize more promising income-earning opportunities, the equalizing impact of land sales might well be underestimated. Strictly speaking, our results concern only those farmers who could stay in the village. Regarding sales, only 40 of the 261 native farmers in our sample reported having sold a parcel in the past. On average, farmers who sold have a larger amount of land inherited than farmers who did not sell (6.6 vs. 4.2 acres) but are otherwise similar. If true, this characteristic further reinforces the equalizing impact of land markets (again, ignoring the households who migrated out of the village). In appendix table A3, we provide some evidence that supports the idea that households who have inherited larger amounts of land are more likely to sell part of it in the local market.
IV. The Impact of Land Markets on Inequality in Uganda: Econometric
Evidence The evidence presented in the previous section may partly reflect mechanisms unrelated to equalizing trends. In particular, it can be argued that land markets are more active in villages where land quality and population densities are higher and farm sizes smaller. A spurious negative correlation between the size of land inherited and land purchases could then be observed for the whole sample. It is thus crucial to test econometrically the trends presented in Section III. In a first step, we estimate a tobit regression that relates the amount of land purchased to land inherited, controlling for various household and village characteristics. The use of a tobit is justified by the censored nature of our dependent variable, since about half of the households did not actually buy land.
As stressed earlier, access to land may vary according to the native or migrant status of the potential buyer and his initial land inheritance in the village. In this perspective, we use the following variables: land inherited and dummy variables indicating whether the household head is native landless or not, his father is still alive or not, and he is a migrant or not. For migrants, our measure of "initial endowment" corresponds to potential inheritance, so that we shall introduce it separately in all the regressions. To check whether a premortem inheritance has the same impact on purchasing behavior as a postmortem inheritance, we also interact the father-alive dummy with land inherited. At the household level, we also control for age and education.
Column 1 of table 3 presents our basic results, using a village fixed effect. In column 2, we present the same regression without the landless or fatheralive dummies. These two regressions do not control for household size, or wealth indicators, to avoid possible endogeneity problems. In column 3, we .14 (.15)
.13 (.14)
.17 (.14)
.
(.23)
. include those variables, where household size is measured by the number of adult males or females present in the household (children are left out because their number may itself depend on the amount of land inherited or owned), and wealth indicators measure whether a member of the household has a nonwage or a salaried occupation off-farm and the material of which the roof and the walls of the main dwelling are made (tin vs. thatch; bricks vs. mud and branches). 14 Column 4 presents the results obtained when replacing the village fixed effect with the following village-level variables: population density, tenure regime (mailo vs. non-mailo areas), land quality (measured by the proportion of area under cassava cultivation in the village), and land-market activity (at the village level). Land-market activity is the average proportion of land owned by nonmigrants that was purchased in the entire village community. The results presented in columns 5-8 use the measure of potential inheritance as an explanatory variable and follow the specification adopted for models 1-3.
The results from table 3 confirm our main hypotheses. Consider the first four columns. The coefficient associated with land inherited is everywhere negative and significant: households that are better endowed with land acquire less land through the land-sale market. Even more striking is the result, with a large, positive, and significant coefficient, obtained for landless farmers. Landless farmers purchase more land than any other farmers on the local land market. Note that, in columns 1, 3, and 4, we duly control for the possibility that currently landless farmers may, if their father is still alive, expect to receive land in the future. This is done by introducing the dummy variable father alive, as well as an interaction term with land given so far. The coefficient of the dummy is nowhere significantly different from zero, while the coefficient of the interaction term is positive, significant, and of the same size as the coefficient attached to the amount of land received so far: when the father is alive, land purchases are independent of the amounts of land already received. Children whose father is alive and who have been given less land may expect additional gifts in the future, which reduces their propensity to purchase land on the market.
In table 3, columns 5-7, we used our measure of potential inheritance. This is important because, as we shall argue below, it is likely that actual inheritance, including the landless status, may depend on the amount of land a farmer is able to purchase, thereby creating a simultaneity problem in our estimates (a father gives less land to a son who is better able to acquire land by himself, say, because he earns extra income or is more talented). Potential inheritance, as it relates to the head's father's landholding and therefore predates purchase decisions by current farmers, is not subject to this bias. The potential endogeneity of landless farmers also explains why we do not introduce the landless variable in our basic specifications with potential inheritance (cols. 5-7).
It is striking that the impact of potential inheritance (dynastic wealth) closely parallels that of actual land inheritance so that, on average, land markets tend to correct the inequality in the dynastic distribution of land. Landless farmers again tend to purchase much more land than all other farmers, even when controlling for dynastic wealth. Column 8 confirms that the coefficient attached to landless farmers remains positive and significant even when controlling for both potential and actual inheritance. This suggests that farmers who did not inherit land may have received other assets from their father (apart from education, employment opportunities, or both) that they used to purchase land, thereby converting their potential inheritance into actual purchases. In this respect, it is striking that landless farmers have significantly larger numbers of livestock (3.0 head of cattle vs. 2.1, on average), which may have been given to them by their father as a compensation and which they may already have used to purchase additional land.
From the descriptive statistics, landless farmers tend to have an age, education, and off-farm occupation similar to the other farmers. Yet, they have larger numbers of livestock and potential inheritances. In our data, only one landless farmer does not have any land and works as a wage laborer. All others have acquired land, either through purchases or rentals. Our estimates above indicate that landless farmers are in a position to acquire significant amounts of land, controlling for occupation, education, and dynastic endowment (potential inheritance). This finding is consistent with two possible mechanisms: (i) landless farmers who stay in the village are those who have acquired or are susceptible to acquire enough land, while the others migrated out, or (ii) there is a minimal operational farm size, and those farmers who are more susceptible to acquire enough land through purchases are discriminated against by their fathers in their amounts of land inherited (yet not necessarily in terms of all assets since they may have received more nonland assets such as livestock). This last interpretation is more plausible since the proportion of landless farmers (14%) in our sample is close to the one observed in the inheritance data, where 15% of the male inheritors did not receive any land from their fathers. Therefore, out-migration of landless farmers cannot explain the result above. Moreover, as we have already noted, there is little parcelling out of land, which suggests a minimal operational farm size. Our results thus suggest that inheritance patterns are biased against the male heirs who are in a better position to purchase (or have already acquired) enough land to set up a farm. 15 However, the assumption that migrant farmers are discriminated against is not borne out by our evidence (see appendix table A2 for the distribution of landless farmers and migrants across the villages). The coefficient associated with migrants is positive and significant and not close to the coefficient associated with (native) landless farmers. Further evidence against discrimination is given by the coefficient associated with migrant endowment, which is small and barely significant, suggesting that access to the land market is not strongly related to the migrant's (potential) endowment.
Among the other determinants of access to rural land-sale markets, age stands as a highly significant factor: the older the farmer, the easier his access to such markets (the relationship is concave and remains positive in the relevant interval). A plausible explanation can be the existence of liquidity constraints and market imperfections that hamper access to land for younger farmers who did not have the time to accumulate social and financial capital on a sufficient scale. Regarding education, a secondary level of education (but not primary) has a positive, significant, and robust impact on the propensity to purchase land. This may reflect the fact that more-educated farmers have better management skills or, more likely, that better-educated persons have easier access to nonagricultural income-earning opportunities or to credit facilities. Offfarm wage occupation has a weak positive impact but is correlated with a secondary occupation. When secondary education is taken out of the regression, the impact of off-farm wage occupation is positive, very significant, and of the same magnitude as education.
When we turn to the village-level variables, the tenure-regime coefficient is significant, suggesting that the propensity to purchase land is lower in mailo areas. Behind this result lies the current uncertainty over ownership rights regarding mailo land (see Sec. II). Population density is negatively related to the amounts of land purchased, which reflects smaller farm sizes and higher average land quality in these areas.
We have so far focused on the land-sale market, ignoring the land-rental market. A difficulty arises from the fact that the decisions to purchase and to rent in land are obviously interdependent. Since we cannot think of measured variables that influence one type of decision without simultaneously influencing the other, it is not possible to identify the equations in a system in which land rental would be a regressor in the purchase equation and vice versa. We therefore chose to estimate a bivariate probit model: in the first equation, the dependent variable is a dummy taking the value one if and only if the respondent purchased a nonzero amount of land, while in the second equation the dependent variable is also a binary variable with a unitary value for respondents who have rented in land. The unexplained part of a respondent's realization in one equation (there is no true residual in a probit model) is allowed to be correlated with the unexplained part of the same respondent's realization in the other equation. The specification of the equations is analogous to the ones presented in table 3 (cols. 1 and 3-5). Results are reported in table 4.
First, the residuals are correlated between the two equations, so that estimating such equations independently would yield biased coefficients. The correlation is negative, which suggests that the two decisions are substitutes: unrealized purchases of land are compensated by a larger propensity to rent in land and vice versa. As far as land-purchase decisions are concerned, the central results obtained in table 3 stand confirmed when the interdependence between land-purchase and land-rental decisions is allowed, for (1) smaller initial endowments are compensated by more frequent purchases on the landsale market, and (2) landless farmers, and to a smaller extent migrants, are more active on both markets. (Moreover, age, education, and the tenure regime influence land purchases as before.) The estimates for the land-rental markets are weak (this is due to the relatively low frequency of such transactions) but, except for land endowments, mirror negatively the coefficients associated with land purchases: farmers active on the rental market are younger and less educated than those active on the purchase market.
V. Final Considerations
In this article, we have shown evidence from central Uganda that land-market transactions tend to mitigate initial inequality in land endowments, rather than leading to a concentration of land assets in the hands of a minority of well-endowed farmers. Farmers with smaller endowments of inherited land succeed in buying more land than the other farmers.
Moreover, and perhaps more important, native farmers who have not inherited are able to acquire more land on the local land-sale market than any other category of farmers are able to obtain. 16 These purchases compensate for their absence of inheritance because their landholding is actually of the same size as that of other native farmers. This finding could be interpreted in three ways: (i) landless farmers who cannot buy land out-migrate from the areas and are thus absent from our survey, (ii) traditional norms of social security give preference to landless farmers on the land market, or (iii) inheritance practices tend to discriminate against the male heirs susceptible to purchase enough land to set up their own farms. Given the low level of out-migration in the area and the absence of traditional control over land transactions, the last interpretation is the most plausible explanation: when dividing their estate across their sons, fathers tend to give less or no land to those able to acquire land on their own. They may of course be compensated with other assets, such as livestock. In a sense, inequality among the heirs is created because it can and will be corrected by land markets. Rural land-sale markets in Uganda operate more effectively in favor of local landless farmers than in favor of migrants. Although the latter can purchase land and roughly reconstitute the landholding that they inherited in their native village, they are at a disadvantage compared to the local landless farmers. However, land-rental markets also have the effect of reducing inequality, yet their equalizing impact is less important than that of land-sale markets.
Our conclusions are thus in stark contrast to the more pessimistic picture obtained by André and Platteau (1997) in western Rwanda before the civil war, where land scarcity was much more severe than in Uganda. In Rwanda, land markets have been activated under the pressure of extreme land scarcity driving poor farmers into destitution and landlessness, and inheritance patterns became unequal only in those extreme situations where further subdivision of the estate would have jeopardized the viability of the farm. All land frontiers were closed, and even return migrants could not get access to their customary land. This gave rise to extremely bitter reactions on the part of landless people toward those who had purchased significant amounts of land thanks to their discriminatory access to nonagricultural incomes (André and Platteau 1997; Verwimp 2005) .
By contrast, in Uganda, land markets have developed largely as a result of rural-rural migratory movements motivated by the search for more fertile and abundant lands, and land-inheritance practices could then be unequal, because acquiring land through the market was easy. However, our results leave unanswered the question as to whether land inheritance could be unequal because of the presence of active land markets or whether land markets developed more rapidly in areas where the inheritance practices were more unequal. Note. Tobit, dependent variable p amount of land sold in acres. Regressions were run only on the subset of native farmers. Owing to the low number of positive observations, the fixed-effect model did not converge, and we used instead the same village controls as in the main text. As is clear, land sales are positively related to the amount of land actually inherited but not to potential endowment. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
